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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Files (Facsimile Security [redacted] DATE: 6 October 1954 50X1

FROM : [redacted] STAT

SUBJECT: Facsimile Radiation Problem, Discussions with NSA Engineers concerning

1. In compliance with a verbal request from the Chief, R&D, the writer visited the National Security Agency for the purpose of determining:

A. What approach NSA expected to make to the subject problem,

B. Whether the above approach could be made a joint NSA-CIA effort,

C. Whether [redacted] could make a substantial contribution in resolving the subject problem. 50X1

Due to business trips, annual leave, and other absences on the part of both CIA and NSA personnel, it has taken considerably longer to complete the discussions than was originally intended. During the visits, contact was made with the following NSA personnel:

[redacted] STAT

2. In an effort to determine procedures, discussions were first held with [redacted] on 12 August 1954. [redacted] explained that the writer should first see [redacted] During the brief discussions, [redacted] also explained some of the difficult problems, both equipment and personnel-wise, which are presented when attempting to resolve a problem in radiation. [redacted] could not be reached during the visit to [redacted] office. STAT STAT STAT STAT

3. On 18 and 26 August 1954 the problem was discussed with [redacted] stated that NSA recognized the problem, that requirements existed for doing something about it, and that a search was underway for a suitable contractor to do the investigative work. Concerning the engineering capability of [redacted] was doubtful as to whether [redacted] was equipped to do the job as efficiently as some other concerns. He stated that it would take approximately $30,000 worth of equipment, six months to procure the equipment, and an additional six months to train the necessary personnel to do the required job. [redacted] would have an opportunity to present his capabilities during the search for a contractor. [redacted] stated that with respect to a joint NSA-CIA effort, he would further discuss the problem with [redacted] and call the writer. STAT STAT STAT 50X11 50X1 STAT STAT

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4. On 20 September 1954 the problem was discussed with [redacted] STAT
[redacted] had discussed the problem with [redacted] and stated that NSA STAT
would be willing to hold discussions with [redacted] held 50X1
a SECRET clearance with CIA. Through CIA channels, the writer determined that 50X1
[redacted] has held a valid CIA SECRET clearance since 11 March 1954. [redacted] STAT
[redacted] stated that the writer could further discuss the situation with STAT
[redacted]

5. On 22 September 1954 the writer contacted [redacted] STAT
amplified the comments of [redacted] and stated that if [redacted] held a STAT
valid SECRET clearance, the problem could be discussed with [redacted] along
with other potential contractors. [redacted] stated that NSA was going to STAT
pursue the radiation problem extensively, that any investigative contract 50X1
entered into would be expanded to include both voice and facsimile cyphering
devices, and that NSA had divided the problem into two categories:

A. The extent of radiation in facsimile terminal equipment which could possibly result in intelligence compromise.

B. The possibility of the above during conditions which may tend to compromise the cryptographic aids. (This part of the problem is being handled by NSA with TOP SECRET security)

6. During discussions with [redacted] on 4 and 5 October 1954, the STAT
advisability of a joint NSA-CIA effort toward resolving the subject problem
was questioned. It was felt that inasmuch as CIA had placed requirements upon
NSA for both voice and facsimile cryptographic devices, and that NSA expected to
pursue the radiation problem through phases which would parallel those required
by CIA in the use of such cryptographic devices, it might be wise to place
further requirements upon NSA covering the radiation problem and furnish support
as required. [redacted] stated that this has been discussed with [redacted] STAT
and that [redacted] felt that such a request from CIA would meet with approval. STAT

7. Further discussions with [redacted] on 5 October 1954 concerned the STAT
employment of the Intellofax facsimile system which would include the NSA [redacted]
[redacted] equipment. At the termination of the current tests now
underway between the Riverside Stadium and "M" Bldg, the Agency will have avail- 50X1
able a secure facsimile system for transmission of classified traffic through 50X1
TOP SECRET. Pending completion of the NSA radiation investigations, limits of
employment of the system will have to be determined, based upon investigations
conducted by OC-E and upon the recommendations of NSA.

8. One other item discussed with [redacted] concerns adaptors for the STAT
NSA [redacted] equipment which will make possible radio transmission of facsimile 50X1
traffic [redacted] Bandpass requirement would be 300 to 3000 50X1
cycles per second. [redacted] asked whether CIA would have any requirements for STAT
the adaptors, and if so, what quantity would be desired. [redacted] STAT

cc: OC-S

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